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TELEPHONE JUSTICE, PANDERING, AND
JUDGES WHO SPEAK OUT OF SCHOOL
Randall T. Shepard*
As Americans we pride ourselves on the rule of law and its sine
qua non, an independent judiciary. In The Federalist No. 78, Alex-
ander Hamilton described judicial independence as "an essential
safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
society."1
In the course of reaffirming the special role of judicial indepen-
dence in our own society, we routinely decry the "telephone jus-
tice" practiced in some parts of the world. Before the Berlin Wall
came down, crimes such as "infringing on the activities of the
state" served as "the fig leaves of a system that didn't disguise its
real purpose: executing the wishes of the state's Communist Party
leadership and their secret police."' 3 Even as the world enters the
twenty-first century, there are still nations where a judge can ex-
pect to receive a call from a party boss or security officer with or-
ders on how to decide a case.4
While most would agree that such overt interference is the an-
tithesis of judicial independence, these are the easy cases. The es-
* Chief Justice of Indiana. A.B., Princeton University, 1969; J.D., Yale Law
School, 1972; LL.M., University of Virginia Law School, 1995.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitu-
tion and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which
the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, some-
times disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection,
have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
Id.
2. Justice Breyer defined telephone justice as when "the party boss calls you up
on the telephone and tells you how to decide the case." Frontline: Justice for Sale
(PBS television broadcast, Nov. 23, 1999) [hereinafter Justice for Sale] (transcript on
file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
3. Nina Bernstein, Righting Wrongs, Case by Case, NEWSDAY, May 12, 1991, at
18.
4. Stephen G. Breyer, Comment: Liberty, Prosperity, and a Strong Judicial Insti-
tution, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (1998); Issues of Democracy: Protecting Judi-
cial Independence: A Global Effort, 18 ELECTRONIC J. OF U.S. INFO. AGENCY 1, (Dec.
1, 1998), (interview with Cynthia Hall), at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/
1296/ijde/pitts.htm.
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sence of telephone justice is decision-making on grounds external
to the judge's own assessment of the law and the facts of a case.
This evil may appear in many subtle guises. Judges must resist
outside influence to maintain the uncompromised impartiality our
offices require. There is more to looking outside the case and the
law for direction then waiting for a call from the KGB or the Stasi.
Judges face external pressures every day.
The temptation to pander to these external influences has never
been greater. Federal judicial nomination and confirmation pro-
ceedings are openly political.5 Judicial races are more expensive
and hotly contested than ever before.6 Media attention to court
decisions has increased to the point where judges may attain celeb-
rity status virtually overnight.7
The siren call of celebrity and career advancement (or, for that
matter, simple preservation) is difficult to resist. The need for re-
sistance is acute, however, against a backdrop littered with fak-
ers-"Judge Judies" who are not constrained by the code of
judicial conduct; people who tarnish the judiciary's standing with
the public for purposes of financial gain.8
5. See Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent
And Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 58 (2000)
[A] growing array of voices seem to measure judicial appointments and per-
formance by applying outcome-determinative litmus tests .... In the years
since the contentious confirmation hearings that resulted in the rejection of
Judge Robert H. Bork, it has become common practice for Senators to seek
to extract commitments from nominees to the federal bench about how they
would vote on particular issues.
Id; see also Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing
"Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Consent" 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001) ("In
addition to concerns over the ideology of particular nominees, members of the Senate
have held up the Administration's nominees in hopes of securing judicial nominations
for their allies.").
6. See Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, NATION, Jan. 26,
1998, at 11.
7. See, e.g., Daniel M. Kolkey, Point/Counterpoint: Should Cameras Be Banned
From California's Courts?, CAL. B.J., Feb. 1996, at 14 ("Can anyone dispute that tele-
vising the O.J. Simpson trial during the day led to the parodies of Judge Ito during the
night? How many 'Dancing Itos' will it take to recognize that cameras can become a
cancer that gradually gnaws away at our courts' dignity?"). See also Joan Biskupic,
Has Public Interest in Trials Become Public Pressure on the Justice System? WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 1997, at A01.
8. See Mike Farrell, Editorial, There's Disorder in the Court-and Television
Stands Accused, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2000, at B9.
[T]he public regularly' submits complaints about Judge Judy and other TV
judges to the [California] Commission on Judicial Performance. Obviously,
many people don't understand that Judge Judy and most of her cohorts are
not current members of any judiciary .... [T]o preside in TV courts, you
don't even have to be a lawyer. All they have to be is brazen enough to put
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The first four sections of this article identify four permutations of
telephone justice: pandering for confirmation, pandering to politi-
cal pressure, pandering for votes, and pandering to the cameras.
The final section tells the extraordinary tale that should perhaps go
into the reporters as Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson v. Microsoft.
I. PANDERING FOR CONFIRMATION
When the Senate considered the nomination of Thurgood Mar-
shall in 1967, the popular consensus was that candidates for the
Supreme Court should not disclose their positions on substantive
law. As Senator Edward M. Kennedy then said, "We are not
charged with the responsibility of approving a man to be associate
justice of the Supreme Court only if his views always coincide with
our own."9 Senator Kennedy has since adopted a different ap-
proach to the proper role of the Senate, 10 and the nature of Senate
confirmation itself has changed.
Federal judicial selection entered the modern media era in 1981,
when Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's confirmation hearings were
covered live by radio and television.1' When pressured by the me-
dia to state her position on certain issues, however, Justice
O'Connor demurred:
I do not believe that as a nominee I can tell you how I might
vote on a particular issue which may come before the Court, or
endorse or criticize specific Suprem[e] Court decisions present-
ing issues which may well come before the Court again. To do
so would mean that I have prejudged the matter or have morally
committed myself to a certain position. Such a statement by me
as to how I might resolve a particular issue or what I might do in
a future Court action might make it necessary for me to disqual-
ify myself on the matter. This would result in my inability to do
on a robe and pick up a gavel, and obnoxious enough to draw attention to
themselves.
Id.
9. James S. Robbins, Editorial, Apply Marshall's Principles to Clarence Thomas,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991, at A20.
10. Commentary, Sen. Kennedy's Confirmation Conversion, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1991 (reporting that Senator Kennedy had begun paying closer attention to the
Supreme Court candidates' political views in determining their propriety for office).
11. Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to
Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (1988).
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my sworn duty; namely, to decide cases that come before the
Court.12
Five years later, Supreme Court nominee Antonin Scalia was
similarly circumspect. When Senate Judiciary Committee chair-
man Strom Thurmond asked Scalia if Marbury v. Madison "re-
quired the President and the Congress to always adhere to the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution," Scalia answered, "I do
not think I should answer questions regarding any specific Su-
preme Court opinion, even one as fundamental as Marbury v.
Madison."'3
Two years later, however, nominee Robert Bork's confirmation
hearings became the high-water mark for the grilling of a Supreme
Court candidate. 4 In his effort to counter tough questioning by
simplifying responses and speaking directly to the public, Bork en-
ded up softening his previously stated positions so much that his
credibility suffered.' 5 Ultimately, he moderated his previous views
so significantly that Senator Patrick Leahy described him as having
experienced "confirmation conversion. '"16
In the years following the Bork inquisition, the Senate has been
less effective in its efforts to pin down Supreme Court candidates'
views on contentious subjects. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer "felt free to decline to disclose their views on con-
troversial issues and cases . . . . Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
12. Nomination of Sandra O'Connor: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on the Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona to Serve as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 97th Cong. 57-58 (1981).
13. Totenberg, supra note 11, at 1219 (quoting Nomination of Judge Antonin
Scalia to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 33 (1986)).
14. Denning, supra note 5, at 2 (describing the confirmation process as "contami-
nated by the toxic levels of partisanship produced by the battle over the nomination
of Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987").
15. ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA 221 (1989). "Bork had spent a quarter century assailing liberal,
rights-oriented constitutional decisions in the harshest possible terms. Now, however,
he withdrew into a lawyerly cautious shell on the stand. His statements were mea-
sured and often seemed inconsistent with what he had been saying for decades." Id.
16. Arthur N. Eisenberg, Repaid in the Coin of a Controversialist: The Bork Con-
firmation Process, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1990) (book review). Senator
Leahy has apparently found a solution to whatever danger such conversions re-
present: stop doing confirmations. See Leahy Doctrine Ensures Judicial Gridlock,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at A20 ("To date, only eight of the president's nominees
have been confirmed. This works out to a measly 15 percent confirmation rate for the
president - not too good compared with his predecessors' success rates of 93 percent
and up.").
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Thomas ... rebuffed all attempts to explore their opinions of im-
portant principles and cases. 17
Although the Senate tempered its attacks in the latest Supreme
Court confirmation hearings, we cannot assume that this compara-
tively restrained approach will continue. Recent presidential elec-
tions have focused heavily on each candidate's likely Supreme
Court nominees,1 8 and other federal judicial appointments have
been the subject of much political gamesmanship.' 9 As Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg said, recent congressional attacks on judicial
independence "can fairly be described as political hazing of federal
judicial nominees. '20 Those who aspire to the federal bench can-
not help but fear that every public statement will be philosoph-
ically scrutinized by political parties.
The extent to which federal judicial candidates should disclose
their views on legal issues has long been the subject of debate. At
one end of the continuum are commentators who believe that the
Senate's "advise and consent" function should be limited to deter-
mining that the nominee is of an acceptable moral character.2'
At the other end of the continuum are those who view confirma-
tion by the Senate as the people's last chance to ensure that a po-
tential judge-for-life is responsive to prevailing popular sentiment
on important areas of law.22 National Public Radio commentator
Nina Totenberg argues that the Senate Judiciary Committee should
require nominees to answer issue-specific questions as a condition
of confirmation. Further, she lauded the Bork hearings as "a good
example of effective questioning and informative discourse" in
17. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 CHI. L. REV. 919, 920
(1995) (book review).
18. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, The 2000 Campaign: The Judiciary; Presidential Candi-
dates Differ Sharply on Judges They Would Appoint to Top Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2000, at 28.
19. See Denning, supra note 5; Fein & Neuborne, supra note 5.
20. Ginsburg Recalls Florida Recount Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at 25.
21. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 672, 687 (1989) (arguing that inquiry into a nominee's judicial philosophy is
illegitimate and that the Senate should focus its investigation solely on whether a
nominee is "tainted by cronyism, corruption or crass political partisanship").
22. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out the Confirmation Mess,
105 YALE L.J. 549, 552, 567 (1995) (book review) ("The President and the Senate
may, and should, undertake full, substantive review of a judicial candidate's legal
views.... I submit that the best way to evaluate a judicial candidate's judicial philoso-
phy is to see how the candidate would apply it to real issues in dispute."); see also
Kagan, supra note 17, at 920 ("When the Senate ceases to engage nominees in mean-
ingful discussion of legal issues, the confirmation process takes on an air of vacuity
and farce ... ").
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which "his views emerged with some clarity."23 She claims that
"[i]f... a nominee has fixed views on a subject of settled law,
claiming propriety as a reason for not being forthright with the
Senate is just a ruse. "24
There is, of course, a middle group who would allow the Senate
to explore judicial philosophy generally, but not insist upon being
too specific. Proponents of such a limited senatorial inquiry agree
with Justice O'Connor's position that a candidate who expresses a
viewpoint on a contentious issue such as abortion or affirmative
action may have prejudged future cases, at least in appearance, and
possibly in reality.
This is not the only problem that arises when judicial candidates
speak out on specific legal issues. If acceptable stances on particu-
lar legal issues are a prerequisite for a federal judgeship, those who
hope to attain those positions must weigh their ambition against
their ethical obligation to remain impartial in both form and
substance:
Case-specific litmus tests for Supreme Court and subordinate
federal court appointments should be ... assailed. Whether the
test is applied by the President in searching for a nominee or by
Senators in the confirmation process, it is a dagger at judicial
independence. Supreme Court candidates of ordinary ambition
will shade their views in order to pass political muster, and be-
come intellectually "locked in" on a battery of controversial is-
sues before they arise in actual cases and controversies where all
sides are heard and debate ensues among the nine Justices.
In sum, case-specific questioning of would-be or actual nomi-
nees is tantamount to political arm twisting to dictate the out-
come of constitutional questions by the judicial branch.2
In a similar vein, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote in Laird
v. Tatum 6 that a judicial nominee who goes beyond "any but the
most general observation about the law... suggest[s] that, in order
to obtain favorable consideration of his nomination, he deliber-
ately was announcing in advance, without benefit of judicial oath,
briefs, or argument, how he would decide a particular question that
might come before him as a judge." Two well-respected commen-
23. Totenberg, supra note 11, at 1219-21.
24. Id. at 1227; see also Fein, supra note 21, at 676 (noting that "Totenburg's ap-
plause for the senators who interrogated Bork about his judicial views conflicts with
her belief that nominees should not be asked to commit themselves on issues that may
be decided by the Court").
25. Fein & Neuborne, supra note 5, at 62-63.
26. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836 n.5 (1972).
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tators, David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein, agree with Chief
Justice Rehnquist:
Whenever politics becomes strongly ideological, people who
want to be on the Supreme Court have an incentive to campaign
for the Court by reshaping their views .... It is a safe predic-
tion, for example, that the Bush Administration will not appoint
anyone who has taken an unequivocal position in support of
Roe.2
7
Judges nominated and confirmed under such conditions are part
of a stealthy form of telephone justice. Abner Mikva makes a simi-
lar point:
[T]he Senate, as a reflector of popular will, must be circum-
scribed in its inquiries. What the Senate should not do is try to
determine a nominee's views on emerging constitutional doc-
trine, or on issues likely to face courts in the near future. Why?
Because these questions are really a signal to a nominee that he
or she will become a judge only upon promising to be obsequi-
ous, to be a yea-person to the powers that be.28
This is weighty stuff for the future of the Republic as we know it.
If Congress ensures that the judicial branch only contains judges
who share its views of the Constitution, what can be the future of
the separation of powers? Important parts of the Constitution ex-
ist for the purpose of restraining legislators.29 How can such re-
straints survive the long-term abuse of the confirmation process?
President Lincoln, discussing the appointment of Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase, summed it up best: "We cannot ask a man what
he will do, and if we should, and he should answer us, we should
despise him for it."30
H. POST-APPOINTMENT POLmCAL PRESSURE
Some would argue that pre-confirmation grilling is at worst
harmless error, because once appointed, federal judges have life
tenure and are thus free to decide cases without bending to pres-
27. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1516 (1992).
28. Abner J. Mikva, Judge Picking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 594, 599 (1986) (reviewing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985)).
29. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion ... ").
30. Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1162 (1988) (quoting GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES
OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 29 (1902)).
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sure. That assumption was recently tested when Judge Harold
Baer of the U.S. district court in Manhattan suppressed evidence in
a drug case.32 Four congressmen called upon President Bill Clinton
to ask for Baer's resignation, and a White House spokesman im-
plied that the President might do so unless Baer reversed the rul-
ing.33 In addition, Senator Robert Dole called for Baer's
impeachment.34
Ultimately, Judge Baer reversed his ruling. 35 This about-face
was widely perceived as bowing to political pressure, although
Baer cited new evidence as justification.36
The analogy to telephone justice is inescapable when the politi-
cal branches of government react to a judicial decision by sending a
public threat: "We do not like that result. Change it, or get out of
office." Special courage is required to avoid caving in under threat
of removal, but what self-respecting alternative is there for a judge
whose decisions draw political fire?
If a judge violates his or her professional ethics, the judiciary
itself should undertake to enforce the code of conduct.37 In state
judiciaries, internal disciplinary action is usually a viable option for
the judicial branch. The standard appellate processes are another
way to set things right.
Responsible members of our political system should not, how-
ever, threaten a judge with removal simply because he or she has
made an unpopular decision. A judge's role in our scheme of gov-
ernment is not to seek popular adoration, but to protect the rights
31. See, e.g., Mikva, supra note 28, at 600 ("Some scholars insist that all of this
handwringing about the ways and means of judicial selection and confirmation is irrel-
evant. Once a Justice is appointed, he or she is going to march to the Court's drum-
mer, and the influence of the appointing drummer will wane to insignificance.").
32. Mark Hamblett, Baer's Controversial Ruling Leads to Appeal on Recusal, N.Y.
L.J., June 28. 1999, at 1; see also Am. Judicature Soc'y Ctr. for Judicial Independence,
Judges Under Fire, at http://www.ajs.org/cji/fire.html#new%20york [hereinafter
Judges Under Fire]).
33. Judges Under Fire, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Laurie Asseo, Editorial, Federal Judges Fending Off More and More "Po-
litical" Attacks, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 4, 1997, at lB; Mark Hamblett, Judge Gave In to
Pressure, Lawyer Claims, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 29, 1999, at 4; R. Eugene
Pincham, Editorial, A New Tyranny Against Judiciary, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 1996, at 30.
37. See generally MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
pmbl. (1994); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990).
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of all citizens, particularly members of unpopular minority
groups.38
I. PANDERING FOR VOTES
In thirty-nine states, judges must run for office or at least stand
for retention.39 Elected judges face formidable challenges in main-
taining their independence. ° In these states, a hue and cry over a
particular ruling is often driven by the ulterior motive of replacing
the incumbent judge with a more politically preferable candidate in
the next election.4 ' This brings us to our third form of telephone
justice-pandering for votes.
Elected judges face a tough situation. They cannot promise to
decide certain cases in a certain way42 despite many interest groups
38. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor
need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes di-
rected at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; or whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judi-
cial inquiry."); Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Mas-
querading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review of
Education Finance, 60 U. Purr. L. REV. 231, 258 (1998) (arguing that the framers of
the Constitution intended that judicial review be a protection against tyranny by the
majority); Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in
a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657 (discussing the role of judges in
protecting interests of all citizens); see also Gerald A. Rosen, Remarks at Institute for
Continuing Legal Education, MSU Management Education Center (Apr. 16, 1998),
at http://www.icle.org/sections/labor/judindep.htm ("[O]ur role as Judges is to protect
against the excesses of the majority where those excesses violate our fundamental
freedoms and civil liberties.").
39. Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 6, at 1.
40. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 459 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When
prosecutors and judges are elected, or when they harbor political ambitions, such
pressures [of maintaining independence] are particularly dangerous."); see also Patti
Waldmeir, Judge Jackson Puts Law's Image of Impartiality in Jeopardy: The Microsoft
Judge Could Be Accused of Bias in Speaking out Before the Case Has Completed Its
Journey Through the Appeal Process, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 2000, at 4 ("With over 40
states electing at least some judges-and money-in-politics becoming ever more of a
problem-the law's image of impartiality is in jeopardy."). See generally Shirley S.
Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973 (2001) (discussing the
pressures that elected judges face).
41. See Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 6 ("The campaign fundraising scandal has
drawn new attention to the way moneyed interests buy political favors in Washington.
But far from the nation's capital, many of these same donors operate unchecked in a
venue that may prove more disturbing than the Lincoln Bedroom: the state courts.").
42. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5(A)(3) (1990) ("A candi-
date for a judicial office: (a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office
and act in a manner consistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary
. ... ). The accompanying commentary states that "Section 5A(3)(d) prohibits a
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who take extraordinary efforts to extract precisely such promises. a3
Their opponents, on the other hand, have the luxury of selecting
"sound bites" that may tell less than the whole truth. For example,
opponents of Louisiana Chief Justice Pascal Calogero charged that
he "voted in favor of business only 3 percent of the time"-a statis-
tic Calogero disparaged as "highly selective and distorted," noting
that he had voted over 50,000 times during his twenty-five years on
the court.44
Elections create a powerful incentive for judges to push the en-
velope of judicial conduct. Additionally, elections create a risk that
the public will perceive that justice is for sale.4 5 In 1988 the Texas
Medical Association's Political Action Committee succeeded in fill-
ing five of nine state supreme court seats with TEXPAC-supported
judges. In a TEXPAC video, one of the justices openly acknowl-
edged, "I wouldn't be on the Texas Supreme Court if it wasn't for
the help that the medical community gave me."'46 How could that
judge then expect the public to believe that he would approach
medical malpractice cases without bias? In discussing Texas' situa-
tion, former State Supreme Court Justice Bob Gammage recalled
the old political saying, "You dance with them what brung you." 4 7
Popular election of judges presents a dilemma because the judi-
cial candidate's desire to say things that might win votes unavoid-
ably clashes with his or her obligation to due process. 48 Whenever
judges allow the voting booth to affect their decisions, they are
practicing telephone justice. The same problem occurs when a
judge who is subject to popular vote declares or intimates with a
wink how he or she would likely rule in prospective cases. Not
only is subservience to public opinion unnecessary, it also per-
candidate for judicial office from making statements that appear to commit the candi-
date regarding cases, controversies or issues likely to come before the court." Id.
43. See, e.g., George Lardner Jr., Speech Rights and Ethics Disputed in Judicial
Races, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at A13 ("The Christian Coalition has filed a federal
lawsuit against the Judicial Inquiry Commission, accusing it of muzzling judicial candi-
dates when it instructed them last month not to answer a questionnaire that the Chris-
tian Coalition of Alabama had sent to all those on the Nov. 7 ballot.").
44. Justice for Sale, supra note 2.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Steve France, Courting the Voters, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000, at 34 (describing
this author's belief that the threat of popular elections to judicial impartiality is not an
abstract notion to litigants and citing the example of a campaigning judge who opines
that fathers often get shortchanged in child custody battles); Randall T. Shepard,
Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS
1059 (1996).
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versely puts the most principled judges at the greatest disadvantage
when stumping for votes.
The solution is to shift from popular judicial election to merit
selection49 and retention systems. Such arrangements hold judges
adequately accountable because judges who go outside the law or
violate ethical standards face disciplinary action for judicial mis-
conduct and appellate reversal.
IV. PANDERING TO THE PRESS
Another variation on the theme of telephone justice is the spec-
tacle of judges pandering to the press. This problem is exacerbated
by television and the media. The clearest example is 0. J. Simp-
son's criminal trial. Trial court judge Lance Ito became an over-
night celebrity. In fact, some onlookers came to view him as a
caricature after The Tonight Show featured the "Dancing Itos" and
Saturday Night Live impersonated him.5 °
We will never know precisely how the presence of television
cameras in the courtroom influenced the way Judge Ito conducted
the case. In fact, Judge Ito himself probably could not say for sure
if he remained impervious to the media's presence. In the late
1920s, a group of scientific researchers undertook a study at a
Western Electric manufacturing plant.51 The purpose of the study
was to measure worker productivity under various changes in
working conditions such as breaks and working hours. The result
was that production increased, not due to the changes in condi-
tions, but rather to the researchers' presence. 2 This finding is
known as the Hawthorne Effect: observation affects human behav-
ior.53 I would add an obvious corollary: broadcasting magnifies the
effect.
We cannot expect judges to be immune from this phenomenon
just because they sit behind benches and wear robes. Sometimes
the effect may seem benign. For example, a judge may better artic-
49. See generally Martha W. Barnett, The 1997-1998 Florida Constitution Revision
Commission: Judicial Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411 (2000).
50. Amy Fredette, Ito to Speak at Law School Graduation, ARIz. DAILY WILD-
CAT, May 8, 1996. See also Kolkey, supra note 7.
51. See generally RICHARD GILLESPIE, MANUFACTURING KNOWLEDGE: A HIS-
TORY OF THE Hawthorne Experiments (1991).
52. Id.
53. See WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (new deluxe ed. 1996) ("[Hawthorne effect is] a positive change in the per-
formance of a group of persons taking part in an experiment or study due to their
perception of being singled out for special consideration.").
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ulate a decision to ensure that even lay observers understand it. A
judge may be especially patient with litigants when the cameras are
rolling, with the result that onlookers come away with increased
respect for the legal system.
The influence may be more subversive when a judge consciously
or subconsciously takes into account how home viewers may react
to substantive and procedural rulings. As one commentator has
observed, the "fact is, television leads to prominence, or at least to
notoriety, and either form of fame can benefit lawyers and judges.
Nothing feeds the ego as well as the comment, 'Hey, I saw you on
TV last night.' ' '54 Therefore, "[t]he judge may also feel con-
strained to orate for the hungry audience and commentators rather
than simply rule. The net effect is to increase hugely the length
and cost of legal proceedings. 55
To be sure, there are advantages to permitting cameras in court-
rooms. In fact, Indiana now offers online telecasts of appellate oral
arguments, 6 and in one carefully tailored situation we allowed the
filming of an in-depth documentary on our juvenile court system.57
Like the federal courts, however, we have been cautious about be-
coming part of Court TV.5 This is not to shield court proceedings
from the public eye, but to ensure that entertainment never takes
precedence over justice.
V. How JUDGE JACKSON FITS IN
The latest, and most blatant, example of pandering for media
attention did not even involve courtroom cameras. After U.S. Dis-
trict Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered the breakup of
software behemoth Microsoft, we learned that on several occasions
he spoke at length to reporters while the case was still in pro-
54. Rory K. Little, That's Entertainment! The Continuing Debate over Cameras in
the Courtroom, FED. LAW., July 1995, at 28, 34.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Scott Olson, And-Action! Cameras to Begin Rolling in Appellate
Courts; Media Petition for Same in Trial Courts, IND. LAW., Sept. 3, 1997 (reporting
that cameras are permitted in the supreme and appellate courts' proceedings in
Indiana).
57. That film, IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST (WTHR-TV Indianapolis, news
documentary 2000), won the 2001 Edward R. Murrow Award for best documentary
and was widely praised for offering valuable insight with great sensitivity. Avid Con-
gratulates Winners of Edward R. Murrow Award; News Stations Using Avid® Solu-
tions Receive Awards in Principal Categories, Bus. WIRE, June 27, 2001.
58. See David Pitts, Issues of Democracy: Protecting Judicial Independence: A
Global Effort; an Interview with Judge Cynthia Hall, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth
Circuit 18 ELECTRONIC J. OF U.S. INFO. AGENCY 1 (Dec. 1996), at http://www.usinfo.
state.gov/journals/itdhr/1296/ijde/pitts.htm.
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gress.59 He compared Bill Gates to Napoleon, calling him "a
smart-mouthed young kid who . . . needs a little discipline" and
likened other company executives to drug traffickers and gangland
killers.'
Judge Penfield also criticized the D.C. Circuit, describing the
judges as supercilious and lacking trial experience, and accusing
them of making up facts and embellishing the law with superficial
scholarship.6' He justified his astonishing public remarks by noting
the great public interest in the Microsoft case and saying, "I
thought it would be useful to give some sense as to who I am and
what I have done. 62
The D.C. Circuit took the extraordinary step of ordering two
days of oral argument en banc.63 Although Microsoft did not ask
to argue the issue of whether Judge Jackson should be removed
from the case due to bias, the court allocated three hours for the
parties to address that point.64 During the argument the judges did
not mince words in conveying their displeasure over Jackson's be-
havior.65 Chief Judge Harry Edwards summarized their collective
concerns by saying, "[T]he system would be a sham if all judges
went around doing this."'66
59. Excerpts from Second Day of Arguments in Appeal of the Antitrust Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at C6 [hereinafter Excerpts from Second Day of Arguments];
Stephen Labaton, Judges Voice Doubt on Order Last Year to Split Microsoft, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001 at Al, A6. Judge Jackson spoke to half a dozen reporters about
the case and spent ten hours reviewing a journal he maintained during the trial in
tape-recorded discussions with New Yorker reporter Ken Auletta. Judge Jackson also
talked about the merits of the case in at least five public speaking engagements. Id.
The D.C. Circuit determined that Judge Jackson's earliest interviews occurred after
the parties had presented all evidence, but two months before the court issued its
findings of fact. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
60. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 110; Labaton, supra note 59.
61. James V. Grimaldi, Microsoft Judge Lashes Out; Jackson Says Panel That Will
Hear Appeal 'Made Up' Facts, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2001, at Ell.
62. Waldmeir, supra note 40.
63. Michael Brick, U.S. Appeals Court Overturns Microsoft Antitrust Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2001; James V. Grimaldi & Carrie Johnson, Once More Before the
Bench: As U.S. v. Microsoft Resumes on Appeal, a Guide to the Proceedings, WASH.
POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at HO.
64. Labaton, supra note 59.
65. Id.
66. Excerpts from Second Day of Arguments, supra note 59. Judge Edwards pre-
ceded this comment by saying, "There are lots of things that we think and feel about
advocates and parties during the course of a proceeding. That doesn't mean... we're
going to run off our mouths in a pejorative way, because there is an appearance prob-
lem." Id. He later said "It's beyond the pale ... how can anyone assume anything
other than the worst?" Id.
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Even this remarkable scenario did little to dampen Judge Jack-
son's zeal for bashing Microsoft. A month later, he recused himself
from a discrimination case against the company, but took the op-
portunity for further assaults against it.67 In his order, he described
Microsoft as "a company with institutional disdain for both the
truth and for rules of law" and its top managers as "not averse to
offering specious testimony to support spurious defenses."68
The D.C. Circuit had the last word. On June 27, 2001, it issued
an opinion concluding that Judge Jackson had violated at least
three principles of judicial conduct 69 and that the violations were
"deliberate, repeated, egregious, and flagrant. ' 70 It disqualified
him retroactive to the imposition of the remedy, saying, "Judges
who covet publicity, or convey the appearance that they do, lead
any objective observer to wonder whether their judgments are be-
ing influenced by the prospect of favorable coverage in the
media. '71
Judge Jackson was playing at telephone justice. He was not
holding out for a call from the KGB, but he was hoping for a few
fawning newspaper pieces. Fortunately, this was a judicial aberra-
tion and the D.C. Circuit expressed sufficient outrage to make
other judges think hard before granting media interviews on open
cases.
CONCLUSION
Justice Hugo Black wrote that the judiciary has authority and
responsibility to "stand against any winds that blow as havens of
refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are help-
less, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming vic-
tims of prejudice and public excitement. '72  Chief Justice
Rehnquist has expressed similar sentiments regarding the obliga-
67. Carrie Johnson, Microsoft Judge Is off Bias Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2001,
at E03.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Canon
3A(6) which requires federal judges to "avoid public comment on the merits of...
pending or impending" cases; Canon 2 which orders judges to "avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities," and Canon 3A(4) which forbids "ex
parte communications on the merits of pending or impending proceedings.").
70. Id.
71. Id. at 117-120 (describing "this America of ours where the passion for publicity
is a disease, and where swarms of foolish, tawdry moths dash with rapture into its
consuming fire .... ) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 132-33 (2d
ed. 1953)).
72. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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tion of a good judge, saying that he or she must constantly strive to
do what is legally right, especially when the result is not the one the
Congress, the president, or "the home crowd" wants.73
Judges set standards for the way law is practiced, and we must
strive to be models of integrity and professionalism.74 Judges who
succumb to telephone justice threaten the judicial independence
that underlies the rule of law.
Plutarch, in The Roman Republic, described this downward spi-
ral of events: "The abuse of buying and selling votes crept in, and
money began to play an important part in determining elections.
Later on, this process of corruption spread to the law courts and
then to the army. And finally, the Republic was subjected to the
rule of emperors."75 We cannot compromise our commitment to
judicial independence by allowing external influences, however
subtle or apparently benign, to creep into judicial decision-making.
73. William H. Rehnquist, Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1980).
74. Randall T. Shepard, What Judges Can Do About Legal Professionalism, 23
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 621, 622 (1997).
75. Justice for Sale, supra note 2.
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